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Habitat Federalism
Robert L. Fischman*
I. Introduction
IMAGE OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM INVOLVES the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) inducing states to adopt permit and other pollution abatement programs. States can tailor some
standards, but public health benchmarks and end-of-the-pipe technologies are uniform across the nation. Inducements include both carrots,
mostly in the form of federal funds and flexibility, and sticks, mostly in
the form of penalties and loss of control.
This essay discusses cooperative federalism for habitat conservation.
Habitat federalism focuses more on ecology than chemistry, more on
cities and counties than states, and more on place-based variation than
on uniform standards. It is about how land use control relates to federal
natural resources law, especially the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
The ESA in particular, and natural resources law in general, present
special challenges for intergovernmental coordination that the pollution
control side of environmental law has neglected. The most important
of these challenges is addressing the ways in which land use, a function dominated by local government, affects national goals. The ESA
presents this challenge starkly because habitat loss and degradation is
far and away the most important cause of species extinction. But many
other federal priorities, including the conservation missions of the public lands, require some coordination with local resource managers.
Natural resources law interacts with state and private land use control
in a variety of ways that substantially diversify the portfolio of federalism frameworks beyond the common institutional arrangements of
pollution control law. Part II of this essay reviews the narrow model of
pollution control law and then describes some alternative schemes. The
alternative, a broader conception of cooperative federalism is, in many
ways, better suited to the problems of coordinating habitat management
between local regulators and national policymakers.
THE COMMON

*Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. I am grateful to Rob
Verchick both for organizing the AALS panel on cooperative federalism and for inviting me to participate. This essay borrows freely and substantially from Robert L.
Fischman, CooperativeFederalismand NaturalResources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.

179 (2005). I thank Mark Rohr for research assistance.
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Nonetheless, the pollution control model of enlisting state institutions
to implement permit and planning programs that meet federal standards
offers important advantages for advancing habitat protection. Part III
describes an ESA experiment adapting the pollution control model to
salmon habitat protection and enhancement in the Puget Sound region.
The ESA example illustrates a kind of Gresham's Law of regulatory
choice: lax standards drive stringent standards out of circulation. The
availability of alternative avenues of compliance undermines more rigorous experimentation with the narrow pollution control model of cooperative federalism.
The recent emergence of place-based collaboration to tailor habitat conservation to the circumstances of interested parties illustrates the attraction of this tool of natural resources law. In whatever form it manifests,
habitat federalism will play an increasingly important role in environmental law. Urban lawyers will contribute their planning and land use control
expertise to the design and implementation of habitat federalism. And, as
the southeast portion of the Puget Sound region illustrates, conflicts over
habitat conservation are important urban and regional growth issues.
II. Cooperative Federalism in Environmental Law
The field of environmental law has proven the most fertile ground for
creating variations on the theme of cooperative federalism. However,
the scholarship is dominated by discussion of pollution control laws.
Broadening the scope of examination of cooperative federalism to include natural resources law serves to expand what is understood as the
tools and techniques of cooperative federalism.
Commentary about cooperative federalism centers around EPAadministered pollution control laws where states participate in the implementation of federal standards.I What I term the "narrow conception"
1. Most of the important and widely cited literature on cooperative federalism focuses on pollution control and either discusses constitutional issues or proposes normative theories of the proper roles of the various levels of government in environmental
regulation. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation ofNationalEnvironmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J.
1196 (1977) [hereinafter Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?]; Richard B. Stewart, The
Development of Administrative and Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw in Judicial Review of
Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REV. 713
(1977); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570

(1996). But see Philip J. Weiser, Towards a ConstitutionalArchitecturefor Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 664-67 (2001) (drawing from a broader pool of topics to illustrate modes of cooperative federalism). In contrast, the focus of this article is
the scope and taxonomy of cooperative federalism, as actually practiced in the United
States.
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of cooperative federalism is based on this common, constricted view
of environmental law. For example, under the foundational pollution3
2
laws, the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA),
cooperative federalism involves programs where federal monies available to each state are contingent on its creation of a regulatory scheme
that is at least as stringent as the federal floor. States may tailor federal
standards (water quality criteria under the CWA), establish compliance strategies (state implementation plans under the CAA), implement permit programs (state pollutant discharge elimination systems
under the CWA), and enforce rules (state administrative and judicial
procedures).
Broader definitions of cooperative federalism are scarce in environmental law scholarship. When they do appear, it is almost exclusively in
articles that consider natural resources law. The "broad conception" of
cooperative federalism provides a more fundamental understanding of
the power dynamics of modem environmental implementation. It also
encompasses a wider spectrum of tools from which to choose in the
service of law reform than the architecture of pollution control might
suggest.
A carrot-and-stick approach to inducements is fundamental to cooperative federalism under any conception. 4 The federal government
may offer significant incentives for implementation, such as funding
for state environmental agencies or opportunities for local officials to
tailor requirements. Alternatively, Congress may "require federal agencies to impose the 'stick' of preemptive federal requirements if states
do not regulate as desired. . . ."I Also, the financial consequences of a
state's failure to enforce standards, such as loss of highway funds for
noncompliance with the CAA,6 may spur cooperation with the federal
program.7
Though the approaches to cooperative federalism may emphasize
such administrative practices as standard-setting, planning, certifying,
and permitting, there is a monetary incentive lurking in the background.

2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (1990).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
4. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of FederalPower
and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 205-06 (1997).

5. Id. at 206.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(m), 7509 (1990).
7. See, e.g., Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320, 1331 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(noting the importance of coercive measures in states' enforcement of federal regulation), vacated on other grounds, 109 F.3d 440 (8th Cir. 1997).
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Money, especially federal grants, almost always sweetens a cooperative
deal. The sad truth about implementation of environmental law is that
it is largely limited by what agencies (and sometimes third parties, such
as private attorneys general) can afford to do. While the legal structure of cooperative federalism is very important, it is the funding for
it that most controls the extent of state participation. The strength of
the inducement in cooperative federal relationships will depend on the
significance of the funds at stake. Some programs, such as CWA nonpoint source planning,8 are notoriously weak due to paltry funding. 9
In contrast, the highway funds at stake in the CAA do induce states to
participate in comprehensive planning and regional cooperation.
Other inducements to cooperative federalism similarly vary in
strength. Participation in cooperative federalism is most attractive when
the federal government is largely bound by the state determination, as
in Coastal Zone Management Act consistency.'0 A less powerful, but
still attractive, lure for state participation in federal procedure is the
relatively formal consideration given to state and local resource plans
found in the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) general management
planning.II On the weak end of the spectrum, the Forest Service roadless rule's invitation for states to submit proposals comes with little in
the way of procedural or substantive assurance that state efforts will
yield significant influence on the federal decision makers.' 2 This spectrum of federal deference to state preference through procedure mirrors
the tailoring component of the standard pollution control model, where
states are more likely to participate where the EPA has relatively weak
abilities to override their choices.
A. The Narrow Conception
of Cooperative Federalism
The narrow conception focuses on programs in which the federal government establishes minimum standards that states may opt to implement through programs that are no less stringent. There are two key
elements to the traditional, narrow definition of cooperative federalism: (1) fostering state administrative programs and (2) delegating
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2002).
9. See, e.g., David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution,and Regulatory
Control: The Clean Water Act's Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV.
515, 527 (1996); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER POLLUTION: GREATER EPA
LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO REDUCE NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 29-30 (1990).
10. See infra Part II.B.3.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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tailored standard-setting. Both of these elements operate under oversight by the federal government. In practice, this oversight is generally
less strict than legislation suggests because of political considerations
and fiscal limitations. These elements constitute a deeply rooted program resulting from years of administrative experience and fine-tuning
through litigation and legislation. Perhaps most important, they are
the interface between the national pollution control regime and the
hundreds of thousands of people and businesses subject to regulatory
restrictions.
1. STATE PROGRAMS

Fostering state programs, the first element of the narrow conception of
cooperative federalism, has three components. The first is an offer of
federal "carrots." The federal government underwrites a good portion
of the state programs it wishes to promote, and funding is the chief
incentive for states to participate in cooperative federalism. The "partnership" rhetoric that is now prevalent in environmental law builds on
a foundation of cost-sharing for state administration. Though many
federally funded programs, such as the nonpoint source control incentives,' 3 are loosely organized, the flagship pollution control programs
allow states to implement their own permit schemes in place of a federal
permit requirement. 14 State permit programs offer local polluters the
convenience of working solely with the state agency for authorizations,
without having to pursue either dual state/federal permits or sole federal
permits issued at a more distant, less responsive office.
The second component is the federal stringency floor by which states 5
may tailor pollution control programs to be stricter, but not more lax,
than the federal standards. 16 The floor may concern both substantive
standards for environmental performance, such as the application of a
best available technology, and administrative standards, such as public
participation provisions in permit issuance. Although states are generally free to enact environmental regulation that is more stringent than
the federal standard, most states deviate little from the federal floor.
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2002).
14. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000) (describing the national pollutant discharge
elimination system [NPDES] permitting scheme that allows states to create their own
permit programs in lieu of the federal program).
15. Local jurisdictions, such as storm water treatment districts, may also be cooperative partners with the federal government in some of the pollution control programs.
See, e.g., Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing
Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722 (Dec. 8, 1999).
16. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3)(A) (2000).
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The third component of fostering state programs is federal enforcement,
or oversight and penalties: sticking to the funding carrot. The federal
government requires cooperating states to submit to continual oversight.
States face federal scrutiny of programmatic matters, such as enforcement records and administrative procedures, as well as individual decisions, such as particular permits or administrative orders.17 Failure to
meet even procedural requirements, such as refusing to allow citizens
to challenge permit applications, may result in revocation of a state's
authorization to substitute its program for the EPA's. 18 Moreover, states
are subject to penalties for failure to fulfill agreements with the federal
government or to meet statutory requirements. 9 Ordinarily the penalty
is disqualification for federal funding of state environmental programs or
revocation of authorization to operate permit programs. However, some
legislation, such as the CAA's link to federal highway funding, provides
dramatically greater fiscal penalties for state noncompliance.
2. STATE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS

State standard-setting is the second element of the narrow conception of
cooperative federalism. Notwithstanding the stringency floor for state
programs, cooperative federalism programs typically allow for significant customization of standards. For instance, under the CWA, states
have a great deal of discretion in determining water quality standards
by defining designated uses and their applications to particular bodies
of water.20 Moreover, when allocating pollution loads for waters that
cannot attain their designated uses, states are largely free to pursue their

17. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (outlining federal oversight of state NPDES permit programs). See generally LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 7.7 (Sheldon M.
Novick ed., 2002) (discussing federal oversight of state programs in pollution law).
18. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (providing for withdrawal of federal approval of
a state program when the state is not administering the program in accordance with federal requirements). Threat of revocation, however, may be weakened by the EPA's lack
of capacity to actually run permit programs in the states. See Kenneth M. Murchison,
Learningfrom More Than Five-and-a-HalfDecades of Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527,
594-95 (2005) ("EPA can revoke a state's delegating authority to administer the [NPDES permit program] but Congress has not funded or staffed the federal agency to
administer [the programs when states fail.] As a result, EPA never has revoked a state's
authority to administer the [NPDES] program when a state has failed to perform its
obligations."); John Pendergrass, Md. Air Program Takeback Sad for All, ENVTL. F.,
Jan./Feb. 2002, at 6 ("On the practical side, EPA does not have the staff to administer a
complete air permitting program in [a state found to fail to meet minimum requirements
of federal law].").
19. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1256(e) (1987) (conditioning federal grants on states'
monitoring procedures and contingency planning).
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)-(c).
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own priorities. 2' Similarly, in writing state implementation plans (SIPs)
under the CAA to achieve attainment of the federally determined national ambient air quality standards, states have wide latitude to choose
among air pollution abatement and reduction strategies.22
States may tailor their standards to regional economic and social priorities, but there are aspects of the process that must be justified by
science, which is almost exclusively funded and supplied by the federal
government. For example, water quality standards are measured against
criteria that the EPA establishes through its labs and funded experiments.2 3 Similarly, in their SIPs, states must justify deviations from the
elaborate federal models that combine sources of pollution into a prediction of ambient air quality for a region.24 While the federal science
is a form of national subsidy for states that are unlikely to be able to
afford to conduct comparable studies, it is also a significant restriction
on state tailoring.
B. The Broad Conception of CooperativeFederalism
The broad conception of cooperative federalism includes all programs
with incentives for state, tribal, and local jurisdictions to help advance
federal law.25 Natural resources law provides important additional
tools to extend cooperative federalism beyond the narrow conception.26 These tools are particularly well suited for site-specific habitat
federalism because of the strong tradition of decentralized management in resource management law. 27 This section describes important models of intergovernmental coordination in natural resources
law and distills principles that are particularly helpful in habitat
management.

21. See id. § 1313(d).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1990).
23. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2000).
24. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.112 (1996).
25. See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 1, at 668-69.
26. For key scholarly works exploring the broad conception of cooperative federalism, see generally Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources
Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179 (2005); Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or Layered Federalism: Can CooperativeFederalism Models
from Other Laws Save Our Public Lands?, 3 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
193 (1996); A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, 54 MD. L. REV. 1315 (1995);
Richard H. Cowart & Sally K. Fairfax, Public Lands Federalism: Judicial Theory and
Administrative Reality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 375 (1988).
27. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 1, at 1210. But see Jason Scott Johnston, The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics of American Natural

Resource Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 487, 531-83 (2003) (stressing the historic
theme of central national control in U.S. resource management).
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Cooperative federalism generally involves the national government,
through legislation and oversight by federal agencies, working with and
inducing state (or tribal) legislatures and agencies to take certain actions.
Local jurisdictions that have delegated state powers under enabling
legislation may stand in for the state actor in cooperative federalism.
Habitat federalism is more likely to reach down to induce cooperation
directly from local land use control jurisdictions. But an irreducible aspect of even the broad conception of cooperative federalism is that it
involves coordination between some entity of the federal government
8
and a counterpart from a state government.1
Thus, many of the recent initiatives designed to increase public participation in land management decisions pursuant to the George W. Bush
Administration's "cooperative conservation" initiative are not part of cooperative federalism. 29 Cooperative conservation has been a consistent
theme of the Norton Interior Department and adopted by the White House
in an executive order to all agencies.30 Including corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals as the collaborating partners in
"cooperative conservation" is consistent with President Bush's 2004 executive order.3 1 But many of these cooperative conservation efforts may
more properly be considered a form of private-public partnership, or even
corporatization.3 2 For instance, ESA habitat conservation plans (HCPs),
though they may include state or local land use planning jurisdictions,
are agreements typically negotiated between the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and private landowners, such as timber companies or developers.
For this cooperative arrangement, there may be no state partner at all to
anchor this arrangement in the rubric of cooperative federalism.

28. I disagree with the overly broad definition of cooperative federalism used by
Robert Comer in categorizing federal-private partnerships. Robert D. Comer, Cooperative Conservation: The Federalism Underpinningsto Public Involvement in the Management of Public Lands, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1133, 1135 (2004) (using "the term
'cooperative federalism' to identify the constitutional authority for cooperative conservation, or the sharing of federal authority with nonfederal entities in the management
of public lands").
29. Exec. Order No. 13,352, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,989 (Aug. 26, 2004).
30. Id.
31. Id.§2.
32. For a definition of corporatization, see Robert L. Fischman & Richard L. Nagle,
Corporatisation:Implementing ForestManagement Reform in New Zealand, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 719, 720 (1989); see also COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT:
WHAT ROLES FOR GOVERNMENT? (Tomas M. Koontz et al. eds., 2004) (providing a
recent catalog of different kinds of collaborations); Allyson Barker et al., The Role of
CollaborativeGroups in FederalLand and Resource Management: A Legal Analysis,
23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 67, 72-73 (2003) (providing more information
about private-public partnerships in natural resource law).
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The disparate forms of habitat federalism arrangements revealed
by natural resources law can be organized into three categorical approaches: place-based collaboration, state favoritism in federal process,
and federal deference to state process.
1. PLACE-BASED COLLABORATION

One tool that has emerged under the broad conception of cooperative
federalism is place-based collaboration. A place-based collaboration is
a system of decision making about the environment that is unique to a
particular site or region. Rather than impose a uniform model for interaction, place-based collaborations grow from the particular circumstances of the locus and nature of a dispute. The chief strength of this
approach is that it brings a wide range of stakeholders and regulatory
jurisdictions, state and federal, together to engage in holistic management. Place-based collaborations are one of the most popular current
approaches to cooperative federalism in natural resources law.3 3 They

soften the command-and-control requirements that typically bind parties in environmental law; instead, they employ more flexibility to create a region-specific approach. Place-based collaboration also helps
satisfy many of the criteria for ecosystem management.
One example of a place-based collaboration is the CalFed Bay-Delta
project ("CalFed"), which sought to manage the Sacramento River
Delta.34 In this region, both the federal government and the state make
decisions that relate to water quality and habitat necessary to support
imperiled fish. 35 Conservation of water and fish in the delta requires
some coordinated control over upstream users. CalFed was an example
of an administrative collaboration3 6 and consisted of a sprawling cooperative agreement among eighteen state and federal agencies to use their
authorities in concert. 37 As with many place-based collaborative bodies, the federal government created incentives for the parties to come
33. See ROBERT B. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE: ECOSYSTEMS, DEMOCRACY, & AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS 244-46 (2003).

34. CalFed is described and praised as a particularly well-designed coordination
effort in Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54
DUKE L.J. 795 (2005); Joseph L. Sax, The New Age of Environmental Restoration, 41
WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2001).
35. See Joshua Harris, A Lasting Proposalfor EndangeredBay-Delta Fish Survival:
The Environmental Water Account and the Accumulation of Water Contract Rights
in the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project, 26 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y J. 121, 132-33 (2002).

36. Administrative collaboration is initiated principally by agencies and is not centrally controlled by place-specific legislation.
37. CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, PROGRAMMATIC RECORD OF DECISION 1 (2000),
available at http://calwater.ca.gov/Archives/GeneralArchive/rod/ROD8-28-00.pdf.
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together. The carrot for CalFed was federal funding.3 8 When the money
dried up, so did the cooperative effort. Lurking behind the carrot was
the stick of severe restrictions on water use if the delta's imperiled species are unable to reverse their population declines, as mandated by the
ESA or permitted under federal water projects. But the federal government can forestall draconian consequences of the ESA and many other
laws through waivers and less formal implementation decisions.39
The ESA explicitly authorizes another tool of place-based collaboration, the incidental take permit. This permit waives the otherwise strict
prohibition on harm to listed species' habitat. In order to secure such
a permit, a party must complete a habitat conservation plan (HCP).4°
Many place-based collaborations originate with the need to combine
enough mitigation habitat to qualify for an incidental take permit. Examples include the land use plans for San Diego4 and the lower Colorado River. 2 In those cases, the federal government participates in negotiations with landowners, state agencies, and land use regulators in
order to tailor a plan that both meets the needs of the permitees and
ensures protection of the imperiled species.
2. STATE FAVORITISM IN FEDERAL PROCESS

Another approach found in a broad conception of cooperative federalism is state favoritism in the federal process ("procedural favoritism"),
which is well entrenched in natural resources law. This coordinating
tool reserves a special role for states in the process by which the federal government makes environmental decisions. Though it does not
guarantee that the state view will prevail,43 federal agency decision

38. Id. at 4 ("California taxpayers, stakeholders and the Federal government will
be called upon to invest billions of dollars over the next decade in CalFed programs.
Expenditure of those funds must be based upon accountability and measurable progress
being made on all elements of the Program.").
39. Tarlock, supra note 26, at 1352.
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1988).
41. See Natural Cmty. Conservation Planning, San Diego Multiple Species Conservation Program, http://www.dfg.ca.gov/nccp/MSCP/mscp-home.htm (last visited
Sept. 19, 2006).
42.

LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION

ING AGREEMENT

PROGRAM, IMPLEMENT-

5-6 (2005), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/lcrmscp/publications/

FinalIA.pdf.
43. Recent examples of states' failure to persuade federal resource managers, despite the states' heightened role, include the Forest Service management plan for the
Sierra Nevada forests and the BLM oil and gas leasing decision for the Otero Mesa.
J.M. McCord, State Sues over Sierra Forest Plan, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 21,
2005, at 1; Laura Paskus, Whose Rules Rule on Otero Mesa?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Mar. 7, 2005.
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makers have a responsibility at least to document their consideration of
the state's view and to explain why it did not prevail. The state's direct
avenue to assert its interests often is not open to other stakeholders in
the federal decision.
The federal land planning provisions are excellent examples of procedural favoritism.' States and counties may engage in their own planning exercises in order to receive the special consideration afforded by
the foundational laws governing federal multiple use land management.
For instance, the legislation guiding management of BLM lands, the
Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA), requires the BLM to
coordinate with state and local governments in the development of land
use plans "to the extent consistent with the laws governing the administration of the public lands," and to consider input concerning land
use decisions from states (and other nonfederal entities).45 Likewise,
the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) requires the Secretary
of Agriculture to coordinate with the natural resource "planning processes of State and local governments .... ,46 Also, the National Wild-

life Refuge System Improvement Act requires federal long-range plans
for national wildlife refuges to be consistent with state wildlife conservation plans, "to the extent practicable."47 Federal statutory preference
for consistency with a state or local plan is an incentive for states to be
more organized than they otherwise might be in developing their own
objectives.
The George W. Bush Administration has used procedural favoritism
to give special voice to elected state, local, and tribal officials in federal
resource management.48 Though this may be a way to avoid listening

44. See, e.g., Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 26, at 418-20 (detailing the planning
process under the FLPMA).
45. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (1976).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (1976).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(1)(A)(iii) (1998); see also Wyoming v. United States, 279
E3d 1214, 1231 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that the statute "inspirits a 'cooperative federalism,' calling for, at a minimum, state involvement and participation in the management of the" refuges).
48. This policy, cooperative conservation, was formalized as a national approach
in a 2004 executive order. See Exec. Order No. 13,352, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,989 (Aug. 26,
2004); see also supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text; Rebecca W. Watson, Letter
to Editor, HCNHas It Wrong on Bush, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 21, 2005. (Watson,
the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Lands and Minerals, states that "[a] new Bush
administration policy specifically engages local governments and state agencies to be
full cooperators in our planning efforts."). The Interior Department has implemented
this executive order via a number of initiatives. See, e.g., 70 Fed. Reg. 32,840 (June 6,
2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1501.6) (clarifying the cooperating agency status
of state and tribal agencies in the preparation of environmental impact analyses).
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to national environmental groups without forsaking public participation
entirely, it certainly has given procedural favoritism a shot in the arm.
An example of the Bush Administration's use of procedural favoritism
is the 2005 National Forest Roadless Rule.49 This rule reversed a 2001
regulation ° that prohibited logging and other development activities in
nearly 60 million acres of roadless areas in the national forests. 51 In
place of the national prohibition, the new rule invites state governors
to petition the Forest Service to promulgate special rules establishing
management requirements for roadless areas within the state.5 2 The rule
binds the Forest Service to act on the state petition within a definite time
frame 53 but reserves federal national forest management authority. 54 The
roadless rule's version of procedural favoritism is similar to the Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act,55 which provides an alternative to congressional
river designation where a governor applies to the Secretary of the Inte56
rior for administrative designation of rivers protected under state law.
The state petition provision of the roadless rule has received a great
deal of attention from governors of western states, where most of the
national forest roadless areas occur. 57 It offers an additional avenue for
state influence over national forest management that goes beyond participation in individual forest plans. The petition must contain seven categories of information, including how recommended management actions

49. 70 Fed. Reg. 25,654 (May 13, 2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).
50. Roadless Area Conservation Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,244, 3,244-45 (Jan. 12, 2001)
(codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294, to be replaced with National Forest Roadless Rule, 70
Fed. Reg. at 25,661).
51. Roadless Area Conservation Homepage, http://roadless.fs.fed.us (last visited
Sept. 20, 2006).
52. National Forest Roadless Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,661.
53. Id.

54. Id. at 25,662.
55. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-87 (2000).
56. Id. § 1273(a)(ii). The Interior Secretary must find that the state-nominated river
meets federal criteria established by law and regulation. Id. For a case study of this avenue for state favoritism, see Sally K. Fairfax et al., Federalismand the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 59 WASH. L. REV. 417 (1984).
57. See, e.g., Dan Berman, Western Govs Question Roadless Rule's PetitionProcess,
GREENWIRE, June 15, 2005, availableat http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/Backissues/

061505/061505gw.htm#. Several eastern states have also applied for special roadless
rules, and are the first to receive approval from the Department of Agriculture. See U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture, USDA Accepts First Three State Petitions For Conserving Roadless Areas in National Forests (Press Release No. 0212.06), June 21, 2006, available at
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7 0 A/7 0 1OB?contentidonly=true&conten
tid=2006/06/0212.xml (last visited Sept. 19, 2006) (accepting the rulemaking petitions
for North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia). Rey Says Many States Interested in FS
Roadless Area Rule, PUBLIC LAND NEWS, Sept. 16, 2005, at 7 [hereinafter "Rey Says"].
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would affect animals and how the petitioned actions compare to existing
state policies,58 which makes the petition an arduous requirement for the
states. Though the federal government is offering modest grants to states
to develop the information,5 9 the burden of completing the petition process may dissuade states from participating, especially because there is
no guarantee that the Forest Service will adopt state proposals. 6
3. FEDERAL DEFERENCE TO STATE PROCESS

Federal deference to state process is created when legislation specifies
that a state policy, standard, or plan, if adopted in accordance with certain procedures, will be employed by the federal government in its own
national decisions. While procedural favoritism gives states an advantage over other stakeholders in asserting their interests in federal decision
making, the third category, federal deference, provides greater assurance
that the federal government will actually comply with the state position.
The best example of this approach to cooperative federalism is the
Coastal Zone Management Act's (CZMA) consistency criterion.6' The
CZMA provides funding and guidelines for states to use in developing coastal zone management plans.62 Once the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration approves a state's plan, all activities authorized or carried out by federal agencies that affect the coastal zone
must be consistent (to the maximum extent practicable) with the state's
58. National Forest Roadless Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,661-62.
59. See e.g., U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, USDA Forest Service Provides Financial Assistance to Arizona for Addressing Management of Roadless Areas (Press Release No.
0225.06), June 28, 2006, http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7-0 A/7 0 1OB?
contentidonly = true&contentid = 2006/06/0225.xml (last visited Sept. 19, 2006); Roadless Area Conservation National Advisory Committee, Meeting Summary (Dec. 24,
2005), availableat http://roadless.fs.fed.us/documents/adv-comm/Meeting-Summary12-14-v3.pdf.
60. See Berman, supra note 57. This dissuasion is particularly likely because states
continue to enjoy procedural favoritism in individual forest planning. As the Utah
public lands policy coordinator stated, ("'[t]here's no need to go into an independent
parallel action if the [individual national forest plan] revision process is going to be
acceptable to the state .... It would be a [sic] rather extensive and rather expensive to
have the state take right off on its own and create a roadless access recommendation
plan independent of what's in the Forest Service planning process."') Id. Only Idaho
and Colorado have taken steps to move forward with a petition. Idaho Says It Will Petition for Own Roadless Area Rule, PUBLIC LAND NEWS, July 1, 2005; Rey Says, supra

note 57, at 8. Other states criticize the new rule as (an attempt to pass the buck( on controversial management decisions about roadless areas. Berman, supra note 57 (quoting
Montana Governor Brian Schweitzer). Indeed, the states of California, New Mexico,
and Oregon have filed suit challenging the roadless rule for failure to comply with the
environmental impact analysis required under the National Environmental Policy Act.
Rey Says, supra note 57, at 7.
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (2000).
62. Id. § 1455.
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plan. 63 Federal licenses, leases, and permits are covered by the consistency criterion, 64 which gives the state a great deal of leverage to condition proposed projects by insisting on modifications necessary to achieve
consistency with state specifications.
The same kind of state power to condition or seek denial of federal
permits exists under section 401 of the CWA. 65 Though it is administered
by the U.S. EPA, the CWA contains many "natural resources" provisions
seeking to protect ecological resources.' Under section 401, applicants for
federal discharge permits must receive certification from the state that the
proposed project would not result in a violation of state water quality standards. 67 States may condition their certifications on requirements to assure
compliance with fish conservation concerns in water quality standards. In
1994, the Supreme Court upheld the statutory right of Washington State to
condition the issuance of a federal hydroelectric permit on bypass flows,
in order to ensure that salmon runs on the Dosewallips River would not be
adversely affected by the construction of a dam.68

Compared to the consistency provision of the CZMA, the CWA 401
certification is more deferential to states because it is not conditioned
on practicability. But both represent significant influence that states can
and do assert upon national resource management programs. They are
models of cooperative federalism that assure states a major role in federal permits and projects.
Il. The ESA Experiment with Habitat Federalism
Though the narrow pollution control model of cooperative federalism exists in at least one Interior Department program, the regulation
of surface mining, 69 it is largely absent from resource management.
This lacuna in resource management hampers the federal government,

63. Id. § 1456(c)(2).

64. Id. § 1456(c)(3).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1997).
66. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251; Robert L. Fischman, Biological Diversity and Envi-

ronmental Protection:Authorities to Reduce Risk, 22 ENVTL. L. 435 (1992) (describing
CWA programs aimed at protecting biological diversity).
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
68. PUD No. I v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
69. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328
(2000). This Act uses the narrow, pollution control model of cooperative federalism,
where states implement federally set standards. See id. § 1202 (stating that the Act's
purpose is to "assist the States in developing and implementing a program to achieve
[the establishment of a nationwide program]").
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already stretched thin from fiscal austerity, from achieving many conservation goals, but particularly those requiring land use control to
protect habitat. Habitat federalism, generally associated with the broad
model, can benefit from all the approaches of coordinating and inducing
conservation.
The ESA is a particularly good candidate for adapting the narrow
model because its strong regulatory component provides a close analogy to many of the EPA-administered pollution control programs.70 The
relative difficulty that even the ESA has experienced in enhancing its
effectiveness through cooperative federalism illustrates the limitations
of importing the pollution control approach across the environmental
law divide. Specifically, recent developments in the Puget Sound region amplify the importance of having in place the proper elements
of inducement to cooperative federalism. Insufficient carrots and weak
sticks ultimately undermined the important cooperative federalism experiment in the Puget Sound salmon 4(d) rule.71 However, the placebased collaboration that has emerged illustrates an important trend in
habitat federalism.
The ESA protects only those species that are explicitly "listed" under
a federal administrative process that evaluates their risk of extinction.72
The ESA is best known for its interagency consultation that requires
actions authorized, funded or carried out by federal agencies to avoid
jeopardizing the continued existence or adversely modifying the critical
habitat of listed species.73

But, the ESA also contains a more broadly applicable prohibition for
any person, including individuals, states, municipalities, and corporations: section 9 makes it illegal to "take" an endangered species.74 The
ESA definition of take includes "harm."75 Harm to an imperiled animal
can occur from incidental habitat modification where it causes actual
injury as a result of significant disruption of essential behaviors, such as

70. I have previously described the ESA as a hybrid statute because it contains
characteristic elements of both pollution control and natural resources law. Robert L.
Fischman, Predictionsand Prescriptionsfor the EndangeredSpecies Act, 34 ENVTL. L.
451,454-66 (2004).
71. Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionary Significant Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422 (July 10, 2000) (codified at 50 C.F.R.
pt. 223).
72. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2003).
73. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1988).
74. 16 U.S.C. §1538 (1988).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988).
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nesting, feeding, and breeding. 76 As a strict prohibition, the proscription
on take does not require much administrative effort, other than direct
enforcement, which is exceedingly difficult in the case of detecting injury from habitat modification caused by land development or logging.
Consequently, the federal government does 77very little direct enforcement of the habitat harm component of take.
In 1982, in response to the unforgiving character of the prohibition
against take of listed animals, Congress amended the ESA to establish
a permit program for incidental takes.7" Incidental takes are generally
indirect, unintended harms to habitat that result from otherwise lawful
activities.79 The permit allows incidental takes where a permitee develops an HCP, makes commitments to fund the plan, and mitigates the
effects of the permitted action.80
In contrast to the pollution control laws, the ESA amendment did
not explicitly provide for delegating permitting to states. However, it
marked a significant change for wildlife law in particular, and natural
resources law in general. After 1982, the strict take prohibition could
be read in the same manner as the CWA § 301 prohibition on discharge '-not as a real proscription in practice, but as a trigger requiring certain actions to be subject to the close scrutiny of a permit-issuing
agency. Rather than prohibiting incidental takes, the ESA now has
an administrative program that focuses on controlling the impacts of
those takes. Though the ESA incidental take permit program was slow
it now has been an active area of implementation
to gain momentum,
82
decade.
for over a

76. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2006) ("Harm in the definition of 'take' in the Act means an
act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.").
The Supreme Court upheld this regulation against a facial challenge in Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapterof Communitiesfor a GreaterOregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
77. See J.B. Ruh], Is the EndangeredSpecies Act Eco-pragmatic?,87 MINN. L. REV.
885, 920 (2003).
78. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6, 96 Stat.
1411, 1422 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2000)).
79. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (2004).
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (1988).
81. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1539 with 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1995).
82. Up until 1992, the federal government had issued only fourteen incidental take
permits. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE & NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE,
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK 1-8 (1996). By October 2005, the
federal government had issued almost 700 permits based on 438 habitat conservation plans. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Habitat Conservation Plans, http://ecos.fws.
gov/conserv-plans/index.jsp (follow "HCPs" hyperlink under "Reports"; then follow
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A. The EndangeredSpecies Act's Versions
of HabitatFederalism
The purpose of the ESA is to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend
may be conserved" and to recover listed species. g3 The most glaring
obstacle to accomplishing the national objectives of the ESA is that
the greatest cause of species endangerment is habitat modification
and destruction. 84 The activities causing habitat degradation typically result from private land uses, such as forestry and residential/
commercial development, which are principally under the control
of state or local authorities. Therefore, the federal government absolutely needs the help of states to accomplish the goal of species
recovery.
Section 6 of the Act, which authorizes funding for state programs, is
the centerpiece of the ESA's long-standing but minor program of cooperative federalism." This section promotes federal-state cooperation:
it allows states to share in species management and federal monies if
86
they adopt programs that are at least as stringent as the federal one.
When Congress enacted the modem ESA in 1973, it envisioned that
state programs would play a key role in the Act's recovery program.87
Instead, section 6 has languished at the periphery of ESA implementation. Few states have comprehensive state endangered species programs
that match the stringency of the ESA, although some do sign cooperative agreements and become eligible to receive federal funding for more
limited projects. 8
Nonetheless, section 6 is an important foundation upon which to
build more cooperative federalism. In an era of ever-shrinking state
and federal conservation budgets, section 6 grants are one of the very

"Nationwide" hyperlink; then follow "Regional (Summary) Report" hyperlink) (last

visited Sept. 19, 2006). For a discussion of the administrative reforms that prompted

greater implementation of the permits, see J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress?An Agenda
for Administrative Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 368,
372-400 (1998).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
84. See

DAVID S. WILCOVE, THE CONDOR'S SHADOW: THE Loss AND RECOVERY OF

8 (1999).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (2000).
86. Id.; see also Fischman, supra note 66, at 462.
87. See id. at 463; see also Holly Doremus, Delisting EndangeredSpecies: An AspirationalGoal, Not a Realistic Expectation, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,434, 10,441 (2000).
88. Species Grants to States, Territories and Private Landowners, http://www.fws.gov/
endangered/grants/index.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).
WILDLIFE IN AMERICA
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few natural resources funds that have grown in the past fifteen years.
From no funding in fiscal year 1990,89 the section 6 budget line has
increased in fits and starts9 ° to $82 million for the fiscal year 2006.91
These budget numbers for cooperative grants offer a somewhat deceptive comparison to the pollution control area because most of the
money goes to habitat acquisition, not state administrative program
support.9 2
But grants alone, especially at current funding levels, will not address the vexing challenge of controlling land-disturbing activities
to improve prospects for imperiled species recovery. Answering that
challenge will require the development of state permit programs.
Incidental take permits, though federal, do incorporate site-specific
tailoring.93 However, they lack an adequate stringency floor. Though
the goal of the ESA is to recover imperiled species so that they no
longer need the protection of federal law to survive over the long
term, the standard for issuance of an incidental take permit is that
the action not be likely to appreciably reduce the survival of the
species. 94 This standard fails to ensure progress toward recovery

89. Act Making Appropriations for the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1990, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L.
No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701 (1989).
90. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-156, 1321-160-61 (1996) (appropriating $8 million
for fiscal year 1996); Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-181, 3009-186 (1996) (appropriating $14 million for fiscal year 1997); Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-135, 1501A-140
(1999) (appropriating $23 million for fiscal year 2000); Department of the Interior and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-291, 114 Stat. 922, 927
(2000) (appropriating $27 million for fiscal year 2001).
91. Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-54, 119 Stat. 499, 504 (2005).
92. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund (Section 6) Grants to States & Territories, Fiscal Year 2005, http://www.fws.
gov/endangered/Grants/Section6/index.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).
93. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(2)(ii) (2004) (When deciding whether to grant an incidental take permit, "the Director shall... consider the anticipated duration and geographic scope of the applicant's planned activities, including the amount of listed species habitat that is involved and the degree to which listed species and their habitats
are affected.").
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (2000) (as interpreted in U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK 7-4;

Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation
Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,243
(June 1, 2000).
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and often allows for further declines in the viability of the listed
species. 95

There is another option for permitting that could delegate operational
responsibilities to state and local jurisdictions. 96 ESA section 4(d) offers an
outstanding opportunity to advance the goal of species recovery through
habitat federalism. Section 4(d) allows the federal government to promulgate special rules that "provide for the conservation" of species listed as
threatened.97 For threatened species, the general prohibition against take
need not apply with full force. Rather, the federal government can specifically define which activities are proscribed and which are permissible.
It may even define permissible activities in terms of which comply with
state conservation programs. The 4(d) approach presents an opportunity
to capture the inducements of cooperative federalism: (1) eligibility for
federal grants and relief from potential penalties for violating the statute; (2) convenience and protection of permitees, who need neither apply
for federal permits nor worry about take liability for permitted activities;
and (3) comprehensive, area-wide conservation that promotes flexibility
within the jurisdiction to choose which lands are disturbed.
There are several respects in which section 4(d) could advance habitat federalism through the incorporation of elements from the pollution
control model. First, though most 4(d) rules either adopt the section 9
95. See Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning:Addressing the Achilles
Heel of the EndangeredSpecies Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279, 311 (1998).
96. Another option for delegating ESA tasks is a statewide safe harbor agreement.
Under the safe harbor program, a landowner who enhances habitat for an imperiled species may receive an assurance from the federal government that the species attracted to
the enhancement will not cause greater restrictions on land use. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., SAFE HARBOR AGREEMENTS FOR PRIVATE LANDOWNERS 1 (2004), available at
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/recovery/harborqa.pdf. In the past few years, the Interior Department has injected cooperative federalism into the safe harbor program by
authorizing individual states to implement the program. Authorized states can offer
individual landowners "certificate[s] of inclusion." Id. at 2. This has been a popular
approach for managing forests to provide habitat for the red-cockaded woodpecker
(RCW). Currently, Louisiana, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and
Virginia have state authorization for RCW certificates of inclusion, and Alabama and
Florida are close to finalizing their agreements. Daniel Cusick, HCPs, Safe Harbor
Reap Benefits for Red-Cockaded Woodpecker, LAND LETTER, Mar. 31, 2005.
97. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2000). Of the two categories of species listed for protection
under the ESA, threatened species are not quite as close to the brink of extinction as
endangered species, though even threatened species occupy tenuous toeholds on continued existence. The ESA defines "threatened species" as "any species which is likely
to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion range." Id. § 1523(20). Of all the species in the United States protected
by the ESA, some 29 percent are listed as threatened. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,
Summary of Listed Species, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess-public/TESSBoxscore (last visited Sept. 19, 2006). This percentage is substantially higher for fishes (45 percent) and
reptiles (62 percent). Id.
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take prohibition without modification or grant blanket immunity to certain classes of activities,98 a new generation of 4(d) rules is carving
some exceptions from take liability for certain activities covered by
approved local/state municipal, residential, commercial, or industrial
development permit programs. 99 This kind of 4(d) rule is the most promising vehicle for importing cooperative federalism to address habitat
disturbance. Unlike HCPs, the permit programs approved for the exception to the general take definition must be part of a cumulative strategy
in the 4(d) rule to meet the higher standard (the federal floor) of species
conservation, not merely a means of avoiding an appreciable reduction
in species survival." °
Moreover, permit programs authorized under the criteria of a 4(d)
rule would cover a larger area than most incidental take permits. 0 1
This is important because large-scale planning for biological diversity
is essential for long-term success in recovery.'0 2 The federal government is mostly reactive in habitat conservation planning: it responds
to specific applications. Though the federal government's policy is to
encourage multi-party, area-wide plans, it still receives mostly single
landowner plans. In fact, 82 percent of incidental take permits are is1 In contrast, the 4(d) rule permit programs
sued to single landowners. 03
are based on an entire jurisdiction's plan, which leaves much more

98. See generally 50 C.F.R. pt. 17D (2005) (allowing a "tak[ing] for reasons of human safety.., under 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.21(c)(2) and 17.21(c)(3)(iv)"). 50 C.F.R. § 17.40.
99. 50 C.F.R § 223.203 (2005).
100. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2000). The conservation, or recovery, standard applies to the 4(d) rule, as a whole. Though each individual program approved under a
4(d) rule need not independently meet the conservation standard, the rule must show
how its program approvals will add up to recovery.
101. Id.
102. See Reed F. Noss, Symposium on Ecology and the Law: Some Principles of
Conservation Biology, as They Apply to Environmental Law, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV.
893, 904-07 (1994); Michael A. O'Connell, Improving HabitatConservationPlanning
Through a Regional Ecosystem-Based Approach, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, July/
Aug. 1997, at 18-19; see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., Adaptation of Environmental
Law to the Ecologists' Discovery of Disequilibria,69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 887, 890-91
(1994).
103. Peter Kareiva et al., USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS 14
(1999), available at http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/nceas-web/projects/97KAREI2/hcp1999-01-14.pdf. Excellent summaries and analyses of this report include Frances C.
James, Lessons Learnedfrom a Study of HabitatConservationPlanning,49 BIOSCIENCE
871, 873-74 (1999), and Laura Watchman et al., Science and Uncertainty in Habitat
ConservationPlanning, 89 AM. SCIENTIST 351, 353-54 (2001). As of 1999, approximately 63 percent of HCPs covered 100 acres or less, and 78 percent of HCPs covered
500 acres or less. Only 2 percent of HCPs covered 500,000 acres or more. Notice of
Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning
and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,248 (June 1, 2000).
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room for legitimate trade-offs, mitigation, and restoration, even if the
jurisdiction does not encompass the entire habitat for a threatened
species. 104
Finally, indirect liability for proximately caused (foreseeable)
harms, a controversial new application of section 9 of the ESA, may
raise a significant threat of penalty to local governments not participating in a 4(d) arrangement. 10 5 Notwithstanding potential Eleventh
Amendment constitutional problems, 10 6 federal courts have found
state and local governments liable under the take prohibition for inaction, where it causes a take "to be committed."' 1 7 A jurisdiction
administering land use programs, therefore, may be liable for takes
resulting from habitat modification that it allows through permits.'0°
For instance, the First Circuit has granted injunctive relief against
Massachusetts for takes of whales that become entangled in fishing
and lobster gear authorized for use under state licenses. 10 9 Thus, the
incentive for a state or locality that permits land-disturbing activities, such as residential development, to cooperate with the federal
government in attaining certification under a 4(d) rule for its permit
program would be based, in part, on eliminating the risk of indirect
liability. Combined with the interest of developers to avoid incidental
take liability, section 9 provides the sticks to support a cooperative
federalism approach.

104. See Robert Meltz, FSA & Private Property: Where the Wild Things Are: The
Endangered Species Act and Private Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 382-83 (1994);
Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall Rivera, A Lesson for Conservationfrom Pollution
Control Law: CooperativeFederalismfor Recovery Under the EndangeredSpecies Act,
27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 133-60 (2002).
105. See Valerie J.M. Brader, Shell Games: Vicarious Liability of State and Local
Governments for Insufficiently Protective Regulations Under the ESA, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 103, 108-09 (2005); Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 104, at 81-89;
Shannon Petersen, Endangered Species in the Urban Jungle: How the ESA Will Reshape American Cities, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 428-35 (2000); see generally
J.B. Ruhl, State and Local Government Vicarious Liability Under the ESA, 16 NAT.

& ENV'T 70 (2001).
106. Several courts recognize the Eleventh Amendment's confirmation of principles
of state sovereign immunity and its barring of suits by citizens against their states in
other contexts. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996); Bragg
v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 291 (4th Cir. 2001).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Town of Plymouth, 6 F Supp. 2d 81, 82, 90
(D. Mass. 1998) (granting preliminary injunction against town's allowance of off-road
vehicles where future takes would occur without injunction).
108. Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, Fla., 148 F.3d 1231,
1251-53 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1081 (1999), remandedto 92 F. Supp.
2d 1296 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
109. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 165-66 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
830 (1998).
RESOURCES
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B. Habitatfor Salmon in the Puget Sound Region
The most important experiment using a 4(d) rule to promote cooperative
federalism is the regulation governing Puget Sound Chinook salmon. 10
The Fisheries Service issued a 4(d) rule for fourteen threatened fish "evolutionarily significant units" (ESUs) in 2000.111 An ESU is the Fisheries
Service's application of the "distinct population segment[s]" qualifying
for protection under the ESA's definition of species. ' 2 Several of the
ESUs occur in the Puget Sound, where habitat degradation through urban and suburban development creates special recovery challenges.
The magnitude of the challenges is daunting. Many salmon runs,
which roughly correspond to ESUs, have already disappeared completely from the region. 1 3 Of the remaining runs, the fish populations
have diminished to less than ten percent of their historic numbers. 4
Moreover, the salmon crisis indicates a larger problem within the regional ecosystem. More than 137 species of animals depend on salmon
for at least one stage of their life, and countless more depend on the
same disappearing habitats that support salmon runs. 15 Compounding
existing problems is the likelihood that the Puget Sound region116will
grow by more than a million people during the next fifteen years.
In an attempt to address these challenges, which involve many development activities already regulated by cities and counties in the region, the 4(d) rule establishes a framework for federal approval of state
programs that will conserve habitat and avoid take liability.11 7 The final 4(d) rule generally extends the same prohibitions on take and harm
that apply to endangered species. However, the Fisheries Service identified thirteen "programs and criteria for future programs" for which
there would be no section 9 liability. 8 These categorical exceptions
are programs that the Service certifies as contributing to recovery; and
'
Some of the thirteen
are called "limits on the take prohibitions."119

65 Fed. Reg. 42,422 (July 10, 2000) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223).
Id.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2000).
A SHARED VISION-CREATING A FUTURE FOR PEOPLE AND FISH, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY at 3 (2005), available at http://www.sharedsalmonstrategy.org/plan/index.
htm (follow "Executive Summary" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 5.
116. Id. at 6.
117. For a more detailed analysis of the 4(d) rule, see Fischman & Hall-Rivera,
supra note 104, at 109-19.
118. Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionarily
Significant Units, 65 Fed. Reg. at 42,422, 42,423-24 (July 10, 2000).
119. Id.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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limitations are narrowly drawn to cover activities complying with particular programs the Fisheries Service had already approved, such as
Oregon's road maintenance plan or Portland's park pest management
plan; others cover activities already carefully monitored, such as scientific research and fisheries management. 120 But, for habitat federalism,
the most important category is the limit on take for municipal, residen2
tial, commercial, and industrial (MRCI) development activities. 1 '
The MRCI category focuses on addressing habitat modification caused
by activities regulated by local planning jurisdictions. In order for MRCI
development activities to avoid liability for takes, they must occur pursuant to an ordinance or governmental plan that the Fisheries Service
predetermines to be adequate in order to meet the standard of the 4(d)
rule.122 This determination requires the evaluation of the local program
against twelve substantive considerations that address the recovery needs
of the salmon, most notably the protection and restoration of riparian areas to attain properly functioning conditions (PFC). The PFC are "the
sustained presence of a watershed's habitat-forming processes that are
necessary for the long-term survival of salmonids through the full range
of environmental variation.' 23 Other considerations include avoidance
of unstable slopes, wetlands, and other areas of high habitat value; prevention of adverse stormwater impacts; preservation of historic physical
characteristics of streams; and provisions for monitoring, enforcement,
12 4
funding, reporting, implementation, and periodic evaluation.
The procedures for approving and reviewing an MRCI development
program for the 4(d) rule take limitation are similar to those employed by
the federal pollution control programs in the certification of state permit
programs (and SIPs under the CAA). For instance, the Fisheries Service
must publish notice in the FederalRegister of consideration of a MRCI
development program and open a public comment period. 25 Also, the
local governments operating approved programs must report periodically on their implementation and effectiveness to the Fisheries Service,
and the Fisheries Service reserves the power to request modifications
modifications face
as a result. 26 Local programs that fail to implement
27
revocation of their limits on the take prohibition. 1
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b) (2006).
See id. § 223.203(b)(12).
Id.
Id. § 223.203(b)(12)(iii).
Id. § 223.203(b)(12)(i).
50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(12)(iv) (2006).
Id. § 223.203(b)(12)(ii).
Id. § 223.203(b)(12)(iii).
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The MRCI development limit on take initially seemed poised to remake
habitat federalism in the image of pollution control law. 28 Indeed, one
regional association of local governments in Puget Sound had already
engaged in substantial work to craft an MRCI development program that
would meet the rule's standards even before the Fisheries Service announced its final rule in June 2000.129 Unlike Richard Stewart's "pyramids
of sacrifice," where uniform federal standards override local environmental preferences, 30 salmon recovery is a popular goal in the Puget Sound
region, especially around the urban Seattle area. 3' Also, given the already
extensive land use regulation in some areas, such as Seattle and King
County, the marginal burden to local governments of qualifying for an
MRCI development limitation seemed small compared to the advantages
of funding, tailoring, and gaining a liability shield. Seattle, for instance,
132
already regulated most of the activities that harm salmon habitat.
In addition to harnessing the pollution control cooperative federalism
approach, the 4(d) rule addressed many of the ESA's widely criticized
shortcomings.' 33 The 4(d) rule advanced species recovery better than the
existing federal incidental take permit program; promoted a comprehensive, area-wide plan for conservation; responded adaptively to uncertainty;
assured open public participation; and clarified what activities the ESA
prohibits. Combined with an incoming administration that was committed to sharing federal power with localities, the salmon 4(d) rule seemed,
at the time, to represent the next chapter in ESA implementation.
But that is not how things turned out in the succeeding five years. At
first, optimism about the effectiveness of the narrow version of habitat
federalism seemed justified when, in early 2002, the Bush Administration extended the 4(d) MRCI development limitation approach to three

128. Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 104, at 89, 133-41.
129. Susan Gordon, State's Salmon Strategy Panned Panel Says Plan Lacks Scientific Approach; Federal Guidelines to Be Announced Today, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma,
Wash.), June 20, 2000, at Al.
130. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1221-22.
131. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 123 (1996); Joel Connelly, Public Wants to Aid Salmon, Poll
Reveals; Survival of Runs Rated as "Very Serious," SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Mar. 28, 1995, at Al; Josh Harkinson & Elissa Reiling, Sacrificing to Save Salmon,
E MAG: THE ENVTL. MAG., Jan./Feb. 2000, at 16.
132. See CITY OF SEATTLE, CITY OF SEATTLE'S LAND USE REGULATORY AND
STORMWATER PROGRAMS: AN ENDANGERED SPECIES CONTEXT 4, 5, 15, 17-18 (1999).
Activities regulated by the city include use of property; location siting, sizing, and construction of new structures; alterations of existing structures; demolition; vegetation
removal; grading, drainage, excavation, and placement of fill; road, parking lot and
driveway construction; and utility installation. Id. at 4.
133. See Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 104, at 132-60.
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California salmon ESUs.'34 Despite this additional invitation for state
and local governments to cooperate, the Fisheries Service has yet to
receive a formal application for the MRCI development limitation on
take. Questions about how stringently the Fisheries Service will apply the considerations for approval of an MRCI development limitation, therefore, remain unanswered. Why haven't the existing 4(d) rules
spurred cooperative federalism for land use controls under the ESA?
1. THE OBSTACLES TO MRCI DEVELOPMENTS
LIMIT IMPLEMENTATION

The reasons for the stall in implementing the 4(d) rule MRCI development
limitation are complex, but three developments following the Puget
Sound 4(d) rule help explain it: the Alsea Valley Alliance'35 decision,
the Washington Environmental Council'36 lawsuit, and the difficulty of
attaining the PFC standard. I will address each in increasing order of
importance.
First, the 2001 Alsea Valley Alliance decision undermined the 4(d)
rule by calling into question whether salmon ESUs were properly listed
under the ESA. 137 The Fisheries Service's listing practice had been to distinguish "naturally spawned" from "hatchery spawned" fish populations
in determining whether a particular ESU teetered on the verge of extinction. 38 This distinction is important because when hatchery spawned fish
are added to the population counts of many salmon runs, the numbers
may exceed the listing threshold.' 9 However, the district court found
that distinction to be arbitrary and capricious because it relied on factors
Congress did not intend the agency to consider."4 Rather than appeal
this decision, the federal government announced that it would conduct

134. See Endangered and Threatened Species; Final Rule Governing Take of Four

Threatened Evolutionarily Significant Units of West Coast Salmonids, 67 Fed. Reg.
1,116 (Jan. 9, 2002).
135. Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D. Or. 2001).

136. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. COO-1547R, 2002
WL 511479, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2002).
137. Alsea Valley Alliance, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.

138. Interim Policy on Artificial Propagation of Pacific Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 17,573, 17,575 (Apr. 5, 1993).
139. Kristen M. Fletcher, Status of Endangered Salmon Challenged in Northwest,
WATER LOG, Nov. 4, 2001, at 1, 9, available at http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/

MS-ALIWater%2OLog/21.4salmon.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
140. Alsea Valley Alliance, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62 ("The central problem

with the NMFS listing decision of August 10, 1998, is that it makes improper distinctions, below that of a DPS, by excluding hatchery coho populations from listing
protection even though they are determined to be part of the same DPS as natural
coho populations.").
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including the
biological status reviews of all west coast salmon listings,
14'
policy.
hatchery
its
rewrite
and
ESUs,
Sound
Puget
For four years, the foundation for the 4(d) program remained uncertain while local governments and developers lost much of their initial
enthusiasm for participating in the MRCI program. During that time,
political and scientific debates raged about the role of hatchery fish
in ESUs. 142 Finally, in June 2005, the Fisheries Service announced its
decision to maintain the listing of almost all salmon ESUs, including
the Puget Sound fishes subject to the 4(d) rule. 143 The new hatchery
policy, announced the same day, now includes hatchery stocks as part
of ESUs but distinguishes them from naturally spawning populations,
which have special importance in maintaining the productivity, genetic
diversity, and geographic distribution of salmon runs.'"
The second reason the 4(d) rule has not been implemented is that in
2000, the Washington Environmental Council challenged the 4(d) rule
directly, contributing to the uncertainty surrounding the cooperative
federal framework for the Puget Sound salmon. 4 5 The suit alleged both
that the 4(d) limits on take, generally, were an impermissible interpretation of the ESA and that the MRCI development limitation, specifically,
failed to meet the recovery criterion. In 2002, the district court upheld
the 4(d) rule against the facial challenge in all respects, but left opened
the possibility that the MRCI development provision, as applied by the
Fisheries Service in a particular program approval, might run afoul of
the ESA. 46
There is good news from this case for the narrow cooperative
federalism approach: the court upheld the authority of the Fisheries

141. See Sam Howe Verhovek, "Saving" Wild Salmon's Bucket-Born Cousins, N.Y.
Feb. 4, 2002, at Al. The relevant policies to be re-written were the 1991 Policy
on Applying the Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species Act to Pacific
Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612 (Nov. 20, 1991), and the 1993 Interim Policy on Artificial
Propagation of Pacific Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 58 Fed. Reg. at
17,573 (Jan. 4, 1993).
142. See, e.g., Matthew Preusch, Birthplace Is Crucial Issue for Scientists Counting Salmon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2004, at F2; Ransom A. Myers et al., Hatcheries and
Endangered Salmon, 303 SCIENCE 1980 (2004).
143. Endangered and Threatened Species; Final Listing Determinations for 16 ESUs
of West Coast Salmon, and Final 4(d) Protective Regulations for Threatened Salmonid
ESUs, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,160, 37,170 (June 28, 2005).
144. Policy on the Consideration of Hatchery-Origin Fish in Endangered Species
Act Listing Determinations for Pacific Salmon and Steelhead, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,204,
37,206 (June 28, 2005).
145. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. COO-1547R, 2002
WL 511479, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2002).
146. Id. at *9.
TIMES,
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Service, pursuant to the ESA, to create a take limitation under section
4(d).147 However, in dismissing the environmental group's more specific challenge to the implementation of the MRCI development limitation as unripe, the court deferred a more detailed review of the considerations for a qualifying MRCI program until the Fisheries Service
actually approves a program. 48 Though the court was legally correct
to postpone evaluation until it can assess how the Service actually
evaluated a program and applied the twelve substantive criteria, the
ruling creates unfortunate deterrence. No land use jurisdiction now
desires to be the first applicant for an MRCI development limitation
because it would establish the first administrative record for an asapplied challenge to the MRCI development limitation approval criteria. It is not clear, for instance, whether an MRCI development plan
failing to meet some of the key considerations could be approved
under the ESA. A better 4(d) rule would have clarified this ambiguity up front by establishing the twelve substantive considerations as
binding criteria that must be metbefore the Fisheries Service would
49
approve a program.'
In addition, Washington Environmental Council5 ° may have created
another deterrent for a jurisdiction considering the first MRCI development limitation by confirming that the Fisheries Service would have to
apply the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)' 5' when it evaluates an application for a limit on take."5 2 NEPA places the legal responsibility for conducting an environmental impact analysis on federal
agencies.5 3 But standard practice and budgetary necessity demand that
applicants pay for the effort, which is typically conducted by private
consultants. This raises the real cost for a land use jurisdiction seeking
the take limitation, particularly because the first analysis will have no
clear template to copy.
Third, the PFC standard, one of the twelve considerations for approval of an MRCI development program for the take limitation,
proved to be more difficult to satisfy than the regional land use

147. Id. at *7-*8.
148. Id. at *9.
149. For a more detailed critique of the 4(d) rule, see Fischman & Hall-Rivera,
supra note 104, at 116-19.
150. 2002 WL511479.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *9; Telephone Interview with John Lombard, Senior Policy Analyst,
Steward & Associates, in Snohomish, Wash. (Mar. 21, 2005).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
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jurisdictions initially thought. Among its considerations for approval
of an MRCI development program, the 4(d) rule included "riparian
area management requirements to attain or maintain" PFC around
all bodies of water and "compensatory mitigation ... where necessary,
to offset unavoidable damage to PFC due to MRCI development impacts to riparian management areas."' 54 The PFC are "the sustained
presence of [a watershed's] natural habitat-forming processes that
are necessary for the long-term survival of salmonids through the
full range of environmental variation."'55 The PFC concept is central
to the scientific basis for evaluating the relationship between land
use and salmon conservation. The biological processes of spawning,
breeding, rearing, feeding, migrating, and sheltering are among the
essential functions habitat supports. 5 6 Though the Fisheries Service
retained discretion to approve plans that fail to meet one or more
of the twelve considerations,'5 7 failure to meet as important a standard as PFC might be fatal to a program application. 5 8 Alternatively,
even if Fisheries Service approved the application, the limit on take
might be vulnerable to a citizen suit challenging the validity of the
approval.
While PFC is difficult to restore and maintain in rural regions, it is
almost impossible in developed areas. A 2002 biological review of the
Tri-County Model, which was developed by three Puget Sound counties in anticipation of the 4(d) rule to secure an MRCI development
limitation, 5 9 indicated that the habitat restrictions and restoration programs of the counties would not meet the PFC standard.16° For instance,
limitations on tree clearing would not do enough to restore previously
cleared riparian forest cover. The federal government has indicated its

154. 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(12)(i)(C) (2004).
155. Id. § 223.203(b)(12)(iii). Even though the 4(d) rule did not bind the Fisheries
Service to require that all programs meet each of the twelve "considerations," an evaluation of each program application against the considerations would have to be part of
the administrative record of decision. Id. § 223.203(b)(12)(i).
156. Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionarily
Significant Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422, 42,431 (July 10, 2000).
157. Id. § 223.203(b)(12)(i).
158. See Endangered and Threatened Species; Final Rule Governing Take of 14
Threatened Salmon and Steelhead Evoluntarily Significant Units, 65 Fed. Reg. at
42,431-32 (discussing the PFC as a basis for evaluating habitat).
159. Tri-County Model 4(d) Rule Response Proposal: A Salmon Conservation Plan
(May 18, 2001) (on file with author). For a detailed discussion of the multi-county effort, see Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 104, at 127-31.
160. PARAMETRIX, BIOLOGICAL REVIEW: TRI-COUNTY MODEL 4(D) RULE RESPONSE
PROPOSAL 8-1 to 8-13 (2002); Interview with John Lombard, supra note 152.
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agreement with the unfavorable assessment. 161 Failure to meet PFC in
the most environmentally progressive jurisdictions in the region deflated most hopes that the 4(d) rule would spur a cooperative federalism
era in the ESA.'62 Though the tri-county model probably represents the
best effort anyone has made to keep salmon habitat from degrading
further, it is insufficient to restore the necessary ecological functions
in the face of population growth. Without a major restoration program
to mitigate new development and compensate for past harms, the best
that developed areas around Seattle can hope for is improvement from
a status of "not properly functioning" to "at risk," which falls short of
attaining PFC.
2. THE SHARED STRATEGY RECOVERY
COLLABORATION EMERGES

Nonetheless, a snapshot of salmon habitat protection in the Puget
Sound area is not entirely bleak. The desire of local governments
to recover harvestable salmon runs, to comply with stringent state
63
laws governing growth management and watershed conservation,
64
and to improve local parks, roads, and storm/waste water systems'
have led to better plans and ordinances that are environmentally
protective by any national measure.1 65 Moreover, regional cooperation with the federal government has resumed under a new placebased collaboration called the "Shared Strategy."' 16 6 Though the
Shared Strategy represents a path-breaking collaborative approach to

161. PARAMETRIX, supra note 160; Letter from D. Robert Lohn, Regional Administrator, Fisheries Service, to Tri-County Executives (Apr. 19, 2002) (on file with author);
letter from Ken S. Berg, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, to Tri-County, ESA Response
Effort (Apr. 18, 2002) (on file with author).
162. Interview with John Lombard, supra note 152.
163. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.040 (West 2003) (growth management); WASH.
REV. CODE § 90.54.020 (West 2004) (water management); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 90.58.050 (West 2004) (shoreline management).
164. Press Release, Ron Sims, King County Executive, 2002 Endangered Species
Act (ESA) Policy Direction (Apr. 26, 2002), availableat http://www.metrokc.gov/exec/
news/2002/0426022.htm.
165. See, e.g., Press Release, Ron Sims, supra notel64; CITY OF SEATTLE'S SALMON
TEAM, SEATTLE'S URBAN BLUEPRINT FOR HABITAT PROTECTION AND RESTORATION

(2003), available at http://www.cityofseattle.net/salmon/blueprintdoc.htm; City of
Bellevue, Bellevue's Efforts to Save Salmon, http://www.ci.bellevue.wa.us/page.
asp?view= 1274 (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).
166. See SHARED STRATEGY FOR PUGET SOUND, I DRAFT PUGET SOUND SALMON
RECOVERY PLAN 13-19 (2005), available at http://www.sharedsalmonstrategy.org/
plan/index.htm (follow "Volume I" hyperlink; then follow "Download the complete
document" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).
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recovery under the ESA, it abandons the 4(d) model imported from
pollution control. Instead, the Shared Strategy employs one of the
broader natural resources approaches by bringing together a diverse
group of governmental officials, business sector leaders, and other
stakeholders to draft a recovery plan for the Puget Sound Chinook
salmon. The Shared Strategy submitted its draft plan to the federal
government in June 2005.161 Six months later, notwithstanding shortcomings noted by a review panel of scientists, the Fisheries Service
announced its proposal to use the Shared Strategy to fulfill its ESA
§ 4(f) requirement to prepare a recovery plan. 168 Unlike MRCI development limitation programs, however, section 4(f) recovery plans are
nonbinding. Moreover, the draft plan is not site specific enough69at
this time to identify whether it will succeed in maintaining PFC. 1
The Shared Strategy marks a movement away from the pollution
control model, and toward the use of place-based collaborations as a cooperative federalism tool in ESA §4(f) recovery planning, a program that
has been a notorious underachiever.1 70 Though all recovery plans share
the inducement of tailoring, the Shared Strategy illustrates how regional
collaborative planning deploys the other inducements of cooperative
federalism. First, and most obviously, local governments and their constituents get to play a more active role in the tailoring. The collaborative
process of the Shared Strategy offers stakeholders far greater access to
the decision-making and standard-applying process than does the ordinary, closed-door drafting of recovery plans. Moreover, the Shared

167. Letter from William D. Ruckelshaus, Chair, Dev. Comm., Shared Strategy for
Puget Sound, to Bob Lohn, Reg'l Adm'r, Nw. Region, Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., and
Ken Berg, W. Field Office Supervisor, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv. (June 30, 2005),
available at http://www.sharedsalmonstrategy.org/plan/docs/DC%20plan%20submitta
l%201etter final.pdf.
168. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2000). This section of the ESA requires the Fisheries Service to "develop and implement plans ... for the conservation and survival of endangered species and threatened species." Id. § 1533(f)(1). U.S. Department of Commerce,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Proposed Recovery Plan for the
Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Puget Sound Chinook Salmon, 70 Fed. Reg.
76,445 (Dec. 27, 2005); Puget Sound Technical Recovery Team, Review Comments on
May 2005 Salmon Recovery Plans (Nov. 2005), http://www.nwfsc.noaa.gov/trt/puget/
trtreviews_2005_final.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).
169. See, Puget Sound Technical Recovery Team, supra note 168; see also,
Susan Gordon, Scientists Criticize Salmon Plan, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Feb. 14,
2006; Les Blumenthal, Feds Back Plan to Save Sound's Salmon, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma,
Wash.) , Jan. 6, 2006.
170. See Federico Cheever, Recovery Planning, the Courts and the EndangeredSpecies Act, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 106, 108(10 (2001); Federico Cheever, The
Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the EndangeredSpecies Act, 23 EcOLOGY L.Q. 1, 26, 58(59 (1996).
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Strategy participants have the same access to nationally sponsored
science as most conventional recovery planning teams.
Second, Shared Strategy offers financial incentives. A great deal of
money is at stake in salmon recovery. Puget Sound is openly competing
for a share of $100 million from the federal Pacific Salmon Recovery
Fund and making the case for greater national and state contributions
to the regional effort. 17 1 On the other hand, salmon will likely decline
further if the region does not push recovery, which is expected to cost
$120 million per year. 172 Adverse economic consequences of that scenario may include incidental take liability, as well as foregone profits
from ever more stringent restrictions on development.
Third, the Shared Strategy secured the inducement of procedural favoritism. This is because the collaboration enjoys direct agency participation'73 and advances the theme of the Administration's cooperative
conservation. 74 As a result, the federal government plans to promulgate
the Shared Strategy's draft plan as its own in fulfillment of the ESA
§ 4(f) requirement.
The Shared Strategy, therefore, is a significant improvement over the
traditional recovery planning process. It incorporates a more robust set
of habitat federalism elements from the broad conception. However,
it is also a significant retreat from the binding constraints of the narrow cooperative federalism model of the 4(d) rule. It is unlikely that
the stakeholders who found their planning efforts blocked by the PFC
standard in the 4(d) effort will agree to as stringent a goal in the Shared
Strategy. Without the PFC, though, the Shared Strategy may succeed in
attaining federal approvals and local participation while failing in the
long run to recover salmon.

171. See Press Release, Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., NOAA Chief
Praises Shared Strategy's Puget Sound Salmon Plan, Calls It a Historic Accomplishment (July 7, 2005), available at http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/releases2005/
ju105/noaaO5-r125.html; see also SHARED STRATEGY FOR PUGET SOUND, supra note
166, at 18.
172. Les Blumenthal, supra note 169 (also noting that Congress recently cut funding
for salmon recovery and that the State of Washington would need to contribute more
for recovery).
173. A different, less successful cooperative venture, the Quincy Library Group
lacked this direct agency participation. The Quincy Library Group collaborative process for managing a region covering a handful of national forests in northern California
failed to garner strong Forest Service support, in part, because national forest officials
did not participate. See Timothy Duane, Community Participationin Ecosystem Management, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 771, 789 (1997).

174. The George W. Bush Administration's cooperative conservation initiative is
discussed in supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
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IV. Conclusion: Whither Habitat Federalism?
The stalled effort to import the narrow cooperative federalism model into
the ESA through 4(d) rules presents a paradox: the 4(d) rules are at once
both too loose and too tight. The 4(d) rules are too loose because they
fail to be explicit in requiring compliance with each consideration. 75
But the 4(d) rules are also too tight because they establish some stringent conditions that have ultimately deterred local governments from
applying for the MRCI development limitation. The strictest criterion
is the PFC standard, which would require extending existing regulatory
restrictions so widely that even the jurisdictions with the greatest inclinations to participate, such as King County, decided to forego MRCI
176
development limitation applications.
Even though the Fisheries Service has recently reaffirmed the status of
salmon as a threatened species, the threat of indirect liability for harm resulting from failure to adopt a salmon-friendly planning and zoning program is exceedingly slight. The Service has few enforcement resources
and is part of an administration that is generally less supportive of adversarial approaches. In addition, it would be difficult for an environmental
group acting under the ESA citizen suit provision to satisfy the burden
of proof necessary to connect land use controls to actual injury, or significant impairment of essential behavioral patterns, of salmon. 177 So the
liability risk to a local government is infinitesimal, even less than the risk
of a challenge to an MRCI development limitation approval. The low
risk of section 9 liability from continuing business as usual is the single
most important factor explaining the lack of interest in gaining federal
approval for land use programs under the narrow model of cooperative
federalism in the ESA; if such liability were imminent, there would be
more of an incentive to explore alternate regulatory tools.
Another extremely important factor dampening interest in MRCI
development limitation applications is the continued availability of
78
incidental take permits. The 4(d) rule must provide for recovery1
175. This was the Washington Environmental Council's central criticism. See Wash.
Envtl. Council v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. C00-1547R, 2002 WL 511479, at
*1-2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2002).
176. Press Release, Ron Sims, supra note 164.
177. See, e.g., Pac. Rivers Council v. Brown, No. CV 02-243-BR, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8139 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2003) (denying a preliminary injunction blocking a state
rule allowing the state forester to approve logging on steep slopes because of its alleged
harm to threatened coho salmon habitat).
178. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2000); see also Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
245 F.3d 434, 442 n.48 (5th Cir. 2001).
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and, therefore, demands stringent constraints on approval of land
use controls. In contrast, the federal government interprets the incidental take permit provision, which requires that any harm "will not
appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery"' 7 9 as
authorizing a more relaxed standard for approval. Despite legislative history and good policy arguments to the contrary, 8 ° the federal
government has interpreted this standard to require no contribution
to recovery, or increase in population rates, necessary for incidental
take permits and their associated HCPs.' 81 Though this interpretation
has been questioned in the context of interagency consultations under similar language in another provision of the ESA,182 the federal
government continues to demand no contribution to recovery and to
approve permits as long as they provide for retention of sufficient
habitat for bare survival.' 83 Another key advantage of the incidental
take permit for potentially liable parties is that it offers a "no surprises
guarantee" that makes reopening the conditions imposed by the permit more difficult than revising the standards for MRCI development
program approval. I4
The availability of the two choices (incidental take permit or a 4(d)
MRCI limitation) for relieving section 9 take liability leads to a kind
of Gresham's Law of regulatory choice: lax standards drive stringent
standards out of circulation. In this case, the lower standard for securing an incidental take permit pulls land use jurisdictions away from a

179. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (2000).
180. See Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 104, at 144-45.
181. See Patrick A. Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: EndangeredSpecies
Act Reforms in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
227, 293-94 (1998); Sheldon, supra note 95, at 313; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
supra note 82, at 7-4; Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for
Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg.
35,242, 35,243 (June 1, 2000).
182. See Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 441-43 (holding that the goal of conservation in
the critical habitat designation requires not mere survival but also recovery of a listed
species).
183. See Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended,
51 Fed. Reg. at 19,926, 19,933-35 (June 3, 1986).
184. For more information regarding the "no surprises guarantee," see Notice of
Availability of Draft Addendum to the Final Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,485, 11,486-87 (1999);
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Administration's New Assurance Policy Tells
Landowners: "No Surprises" in Endangered Species Planning (Aug. 11, 1994), available at http://news.fws.gov/historic/1994/19940811 .pdf.
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4(d) arrangement.185 While the Shared Strategy is a retreat from the
stringency of the 4(d) rule, it will likely produce better recovery actions than the conventional, federally dominated recovery plan would.
Nonetheless, the Shared Strategy is unlikely to spur the sacrifices required by the PFC standard to safeguard the future of salmon in the
Puget Sound.
Where resource development is bound to a single federal program,
with no alternatives, it will be easier to incorporate narrow cooperative federalism principles to encourage and strengthen state programs.
For instance, the BLM could bind oil and gas lessees to state standards
on access, compensation to surface estate owners for disturbance, and
waste-water discharge. 186 Federal incorporation of state forest practices
laws, in addition to state water quality standards, would provide more
consistent resource management across watersheds with fragmented
ownership patterns and an incentive for states to improve their programs. Outside of these situations, habitat federalism will likely grow
from the existing natural resources tools of place-based coordination
and procedural federalism.

185. See Sam Casne, Muddy Waters: The New 4(d) Salmon Rule, SEATTLE DAILY
J. CoM., July 12, 2001, available at http://www.djc.com/news/enviro/11123678.html.

Accordingly, an enormous amount of acreage in Washington-about one-quarter of the
state-is expected to be covered by incidental take permits. Robert McClure & Lisa
Stiffler, A License to Kill: Flaws in Habitat Conservation Plans Threaten the Survival
of Scores of Species, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 3, 2005, at Al.

186. Currently, the BLM and the State of Wyoming are at loggerheads over the validity of a state law, which would require federal oil and gas lessees to compensate others for "loss of land value" in a larger number of instances than the BLM's more lenient
compensation requirements. Jean Feriancek, Surface Damage Acts, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Winter 2006, at 58; Kerry Brophy, Feds Oppose State's Effort to Empower
Landowners, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 22, 2005, at 6.
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